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Executive Summary 
 
By almost all accounts, the fiscal health and stability of the United States public 
retirement system at all levels is in peril. Collectively, local and state public retirement systems 
are underfunded at a rate of $700 billion as a low estimate to $3 trillion as a higher estimate. 
While plenty of research has been conducted to identify the reasons that programs are 
underfunded, the system would be best served if more attention were paid to identifying program 
characteristics that improve performance. In turn, these characteristics could be evaluated and 
implemented if not already present. If programs do not want to collapse and governments do not 
want to cut services to pay for retirement benefits, further research is needed to improve 
performance and this report offers one such method of evaluation. 
 
By utilizing some of the most recent financial data available, this report attempts to 
identify program governance characteristics that positively impact pension performance. 
Performance is measured using the funded ratio of a program or the measure of current assets 
compared to liabilities. The tested model is a combination of three main governance 
characteristic variables (the presence of an investment council, the total number of program 
board members, and the percentage of board members that are program beneficiaries) and 
several other independent variables such as total program members. The model has been tested 
using an OLS and Mixed Effects regression analysis.  
 
The regression estimates provide interesting but inconsistent results. In regards to the 
governance characteristics, only the presence of an investment council has been shown to be 
significant over both models. The presence of an investment council raises a programs funded 
ratio by more than 7 percentage points in both models. In regards to the remaining independent 
variables, of particular note are the estimates on the availability of Social Security coverage to 
program participants. In the OLS analysis, the estimated impact is a negative 0.411 percentage 
points while the Mixed Effects impact is 2.211 percentage points. Although neither is 
statistically significant, the divergent nature of the estimate should be something that is worth 
future attention. 
 
By pooling the results over the two models, it is the recommendation of this author that 
programs at least consider implementing an investment council for their respective programs for 
the reasons outlined above. Programs should also consider limiting their increases to employee 
contribution rates as current analysis has shown that a roughly one percent increase in employee 
contribution rates decreases the funded ratio by one percent. By implementing the appropriate 
board and program characteristics, public retirement systems at all levels could begin to slow or 
correct the underfunded problem that has been growing in recent years.     
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Problem Statement 
 In 2012, the PEW Center on the States released a report on the fiscal position of state 
pension plans which concluded that collectively, there is a $1.38 trillion gap between pension 
liabilities and current funding levels (2012). Although there are states (i.e. Delaware and 
Wisconsin) that are considered to be in a sound or solid position, quite a few states are in need 
substantial improvement if they are to meet their current and future obligations. Two such states 
in poor standing include Illinois and Rhode Island, both of which have less than 50 percent of 
their current liabilities funded. Kentucky does not fare much better with only a 54 percent 
funding level. To expand on this problem, states are not the only issue. There are many local or 
city sponsored public retirement systems that are underfunded as well. In a 2011 Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) brief, it was estimated that as of 2009, public pension systems are 
collectively underfunded between $0.7 trillion and $3 trillion, depending on the valuation 
method utilized (Russek). The current state of public pension funding is an issue that everybody 
should be concerned about no matter what state you live in and regardless of whether or not you 
are or will be a program participant. 
 The underfunding of public pensions should be a concern for everybody in the United 
States. The implications of a public entity (state or city) defaulting on its pension obligations 
would be far reaching. First, there is the impact felt by pension recipients. A default could lead to 
a reduction in benefit payments or their elimination, depending on the state’s constitutional 
requirements. While unprecedented at the state level, the local level has experienced such an 
elimination of benefits due to poor fiscal. In 2012, the city of Central Falls, Rhode Island exited 
bankruptcy proceedings with an agreement to cut its local pension retiree benefits by as much as 
55 percent (Russ, 2012). Another example of cities facing looming pension program issues is 
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Detroit, MI. As reported by Allison Schrager (2011), lawsuits have already been filed on behalf 
of Detroit pension funds to prevent reduction to their benefits as the city faces bankruptcy 
proceedings. Second, a default would impact bond investors. Entities obligated to pay benefits 
could have to redirect funding set aside for bond payments in order to make up for any shortfall. 
In turn, investors would face reduced or delayed interest and principal payments. Lastly, as cities 
and states shift funding to pay for pension benefits, other programs and services could suffer 
from reduced funding. In turn, the citizens that are served by these services would be adversely 
impacted regardless of their status as a retiree. As outlined here, the implications of underfunding 
a public pension system could impact not only program participants but also their neighbors and 
investors.  
 There are several reasons that have led to the current financial situation of public pension 
systems:  (1) poor pension investment performance, (2) unwillingness of state governments to 
allocate full pension obligations, and (3) lax or altering pension legislation. Research on the 
various reasons for the widening gap between state liabilities and pension funding has been 
successful in bringing to light detrimental activities and isolating problematic programs or 
systems. Another avenue of research has focused on ways to mitigate the impact of pension 
underfunding. Included in the research are alternatives to overcome pension underfunding 
problems via investment strategies or updating a system altogether (i.e. shifting from a deferred 
benefit retirement system to a deferred compensation system or a hybrid of both). While these 
avenues of research are important to understanding the problem, much less attention has been 
given to successful systems.  
Opportunities for further research should focus on systems that are meeting and/or 
exceeding expectations, in terms of funding their retirement systems. In doing so, the 
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characteristics of these successful systems could be identified and potentially implemented in the 
states that are lagging. Of explicit concern to this paper, attention will be given to the governance 
structure of pension program boards and how governance structure and characteristics impact the 
performance of pension programs. Are there characteristics of program boards that significantly 
influence their performance? This question will be addressed in future sections of the paper. 
After performing an analysis of the available data, recommendations will be offered for program 
considerations. While certain characteristics might be difficult to duplicate (or implement), at 
least with a roadmap towards success, states could attempt to right the ship that has been off 
course for far too long. 
 
Literature Review 
In 2000, Michael Useem and Olivia Mitchell sought to study the relationship between 
pension system characteristics and performance measurements. Their initial hypothesis was that 
certain pension system characteristics and governance policies would directly influence the 
performance outcomes of the respective pension systems. Ultimately, they would conclude that 
the direct impact of these variables was not on the performance results but rather on the 
investment decisions of the pension systems.  
The pension system characteristics or governance policies that they examined included: 
board size, board composition, investment restrictions, independent performance evaluations, 
asset allocation responsibility of the board, and direct investment decision responsibility of the 
board. The investment categories considered by the authors included: tactical investment, equity 
investment, outside investment management, and international investment. Their data was 
obtained from a series of surveys conducted in 1993 for the Public Pension Coordinating Council 
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(Zorn, 1994) and a follow up survey from 1996 (Zorn, 1996). The follow up survey provided the 
authors the necessary data to draw conclusions pertaining to the characteristic influence on 
investment strategy decisions. Although the data was not discussed in great detail in their article, 
supporting articles (Zorn 1994 and 1996) attest to the reliability and completeness of the data 
which tends to indicate sound results.  
Through the use of a multivariate regression technique, Useem and Mitchell were able to 
show that certain pension system characteristics influenced the investment decisions of a 
program as opposed to directly influencing its performance outcome. The list of variables that 
were shown to significantly influence investment decisions included: investment restrictions, 
independent performance evaluations, board composition and board size. For example, 
independent performance evaluations were shown to negatively impact the tactical investment 
strategy, have a slightly positive influence on the outside management and international 
management strategies, and had a significantly positive influence on the equity investment 
strategy (Useem & Mitchell, 2000). The authors then took their findings pertaining to investment 
strategies and examined the impact that specific strategies had on actual rates of return.  
In the second part of their analysis, Useem and Mitchell (2000) were able to determine 
that investment strategies could have as much as a two percentage point impact on actual returns 
on investment. For large pension programs, a two percentage point impact could mean the gain 
or loss in the tens of millions of dollars. While the results could be of significance for large and 
small programs alike, the second part of their analysis lacked a detailed explanation of their 
methods used. In light of these limitations, the impact of their findings as related to the impact of 
pension system characteristics cannot be overlooked. It is from their research that the basis for 
the current study was born. 
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Useem and Mitchell concluded in their article from 2000, that characteristics of pension 
systems could influence, albeit indirectly, the performance of pension systems. By utilizing some 
of the same variables that were discussed by the authors, in particular pension board size and 
updating the data source to more current figures, the relationship between pension system 
characteristics and performance outcomes can be examined to determine if any of the same 
relationships still hold true in today. In addition, current data would include measurements from 
a significant period spanning an economic recession the likes of which have not been 
encountered for several decades. The significance of the recession should be considered and the 
impact that it could and did have on pension systems should not be overlooked. 
Although most private systems are set up in different program styles than that of public 
systems (i.e. deferred compensation vs. deferred benefit), there has been a migration in recent 
years by public systems to take on more characteristics of the private sector. Even if private 
pension systems are different than public, a lot can be learned by examining studies that focus on 
the private systems; one such example is a study completed by Ippolito and Turner in 1987. 
Using data available from the U.S. Department of Labor from 1977-83 (more specifically, 5500 
Annual Report data) the authors examined the different investment strategies and the actual rates 
of return that various plans realized during the specified time period. One of the characteristics 
that they focused on was the investment strategy utilized by the private pension programs. Their 
results are important because they found that investment strategies do in fact influence the rates 
of return. For example, plans that implemented a stock trading practice or strategy saw a 
decrease on their rates of return by approximately 60 basis points relative to plans that did not 
implement the same strategy (Ippolito & Turner, 1987).  
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These investment strategy results from Ippolito & Turner should be considered by public 
pension systems as they could be a significant factor behind recent performance measurements. 
That is, how a fund invests its assets should be accounted for in a model assessing pension 
characteristics. A plan with heavy stock investments might behave differently or see different 
performance results when compared to plans invested primarily in real estate or short term 
investments.  
In the wake of the financial recession of the mid-late 2000’s, the implications on possible 
investment strategies by pension systems should be examined. The strategies that they have 
implemented in recent years could have a significant impact on the current rates of return. Some 
17 years after Ippolito and Turner’s study, the same relationship could still hold significant. By 
pulling data from Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research, the investment strategies of 
individual public pension systems could be deduced and evaluated against the respective 
performance measurements of each system. While Ippolito and Turner’s study was of private 
pension systems, the results can be applied to the public system debate given the current move of 
public systems to adopt more private system modeling.       
 A final paper that should be considered when examining the influence of a pension 
programs’ governance structure is David Hess’ 2005 article, “Protecting and Politicizing Public 
Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and 
Practices”. One substantial finding from this report pertained to the influential power of the 
pension board members’ investment expertise level. Specifically, Hess (2005) found that 
investment performance was negatively impacted when the board made asset allocation 
decisions. This would indicate that pension board members do not hold the necessary expertise 
to make investment decisions on behalf of the programs they represent. This finding is 
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significant in relation to the current study as roughly 65 percent of the pension boards used in 
this study have an investment council making investment decisions. This will be explained and 
expanded in later sections. 
 A second significant finding in Hess’ paper was that the composition of the board will 
significantly impact the programs’ performance. More specifically, the percentage of board 
members that are appointed or elected to their position and by whom they are chosen 
significantly influences pension performance. Hess (2005) found that board members elected by 
plan members improved the overall plan performance. These individuals appear to be capable of 
preventing the government misuse of plan assets. Hess’ results are significant and should not be 
overlooked. Although other authors have provided significant findings and have laid the 
framework for present research, Hess’s findings not only expand on these prior works but do so 
using a more current data source. His data was obtained from a series of state and local pension 
system surveys conducted by the Government Finance Officers Association and the Public 
Pension Coordinating Council between the years of 1990 and 2000 (2005). The analysis below 
pulls on prior research for guidance while utilizing the most current data stream available 
pertaining to state and local pension programs to address whether or not governance 
characteristics influence pension performance.   
 
Research Design 
Variables & Model 
Measuring the performance of a public pension program is a topic that has generated 
much debate. Useem & Mitchell (2000) measured performance based on actual rates of return 
while others, Munnell et al. (2011), have used program funded ratio as the basis to measure 
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performance. A program that can isolate the characteristics that improve performance and can 
adequately integrate them in to their own program could potentially reap the benefits of 
improved performance and stability. The intent of this paper is to present an analysis of the 
available data and isolate possible pension characteristics that impact performance. In turn, 
program managers and politicians can assess their respective programs and make changes where 
potential opportunities might lie.  
 There are several analytical tools that could be used to aid in the research related to 
pension program characteristics. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Mixed Effects Logistic 
(ME) regression models are two such examples and will be implemented to perform the analysis 
in the following section. These modeling systems require identification of a dependent variable 
and a list of explanatory variables. The dependent variable, or performance measurement, has 
been identified as the funded ratio of a program. The funded ratio is determined by dividing a 
plan’s assets by its obligations or liabilities. In a report from the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2008) it was indicated that a pension plan would be at risk of default if 
the funded ratio was less than 80 percent funded. In terms of performance, a program can not 
only use the 80 percent threshold to measure their stability but also as a point to measure how 
much of an impact their decisions have on their funded ratio. That is, are decisions being made 
that will increase or decrease their funded ratio and how much of an impact will the decisions 
have on the funded ratio?  
 The next phase is to determine which variables will be included as explanatory variables 
for the regression model. Of particular concern is the potential impact that pension program 
governance characteristics have on the performance of the programs. Therefore, the specific 
governance characteristic variables that will be included are: (1) the number of board members 
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for a given program, (2) the number of board members that are actually participants of their 
program, and (3) whether or not there is an investment council present to make investment 
decisions. It is possible that specific characteristics of the board members (i.e. how they were 
elected, age, financial qualifications) could be included as well. However, the limited availability 
of this information prevented their inclusion in the analysis. Table 1 below outlines the three 
target variables and the expected impact of each on the model. 
Table 1. Target explanatory variables and expected impact  
 
Variable Description Expected Impact 
totbrd Total board members Negative 
prctparticpbrd Percentage of active 
board members in the 
program they serve 
Positive 
invcncl Designates the 
presence of an 
investment council 
Positive 
 
 The coefficient of the total board members variable is expected to be negative because as 
more members are added, there are more opinions and ideas that must be weighed by the board. 
In addition, there could be additional political pressures applied on board members to appease a 
group or individual that got them elected or appointed. In this case, by listening to others, their 
decisions could be swayed to the detriment of the pension program. Rather than use the total 
number of board members covered by the programs that they serve, this model considers the 
percentage of board members. This is due to the fact that the dependent variable is measured in 
percentages. It is expected that as the percentage of board members that are current program 
participants increases, there will be a positive impact on the funded ratio. Prior research has 
indicated that when board members are plan participants they have more at stake in the plans 
success compared to a non-participant (Munnell, 2011). Covered board members have a vested 
interest to see the program prosper and stay adequately funded because they will reap the 
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benefits from their decisions. Finally, the presence of an investment council is expected to have a 
positive impact on the funded ratio. While some board members might have the training to make 
financial or investment decisions not all have the same aptitudes. By taking the investment 
decisions out of their hands it allows them to instead focus on other issues (i.e. determining 
employee contribution rates). An investment council can devote all of their attention to making 
the most financial sound investments decisions without having to worry about other issues or 
appeasing political whims. In turn, sound investment decisions should lead to a higher funded 
ratio.  
In addition to the target governance variables, the following list of control variables will 
also be considered: total number of program participants, whether or not program participants are 
covered by social security, annual required contribution (ARC) rates, and the jurisdiction of the 
programs (state vs. locality). The table below provides a description of the variables and the 
expected impact of each on the model. 
Table 2. Additional explanatory variables and expected impact 
 
Variable Description Expected Impact 
members Total number of 
program member 
Negative 
Sscov Designates whether 
program members are 
covered by Social 
Security 
Positive 
Arc Annual Required 
Contribution (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Negative 
jurisdiction Designates whether 
the program is a state 
or local program  
Positive 
prct_eecrate Percentage of 
employee pay paid in 
to a program 
Positive 
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 The variables expected to have a negative impact on the funded ratio are the total number 
of program members and the annual required contribution rates. As a program grows, logic 
would suggest that the funded ratio might increase; more people equals more money coming in. 
However, there are a few explanations to counter this logic. First, if the program is growing, it 
could be from non-contributing members or retiree beneficiaries. Additionally, as programs 
grow, there are increased future liabilities which require additional funding in order to cover 
pension payments. If programs do not increase their funding methods in order to cover the 
additional liabilities, as the liabilities grow the funded ratio will decrease. The annual required 
contribution (ARC) is an actuarially determined amount that must be contributed by employers, 
in this case localities and states. The ARC is set to not only fund current liabilities but also future 
liabilities. Since ARC payments are paid by governments, their budgets must reflect the need to 
make good on the ARC payments. As ARC increases, additional funds must be allocated by 
governments to cover the increasing costs. In turn, if they increase too much or to fast, there 
would likely be political unwillingness to contribute more than in previous years to fund the 
ARC. It is for this reason that the expected impact of the ARC variable is negative. 
 The variables expected to have a positive impact on the funded ratio are whether or not 
program participants are covered by social security, the jurisdiction of the program, and the 
employee contribution percentage. The jurisdiction variable indicates whether or not a plan is 
operated at the state level or the local level. It is anticipated that the larger state managed plans 
would have a better or higher funded ratio due to the presence of additional resources (monetary 
or not) that small cities lack. Therefore, the estimated impact should be positive signifying that a 
state plan would have a positive impact on the funded ratio. The employee contribution 
percentage measures how much of their pay a public employee must contribute towards the 
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retirement program. It is expected that as this rate increases, the funded ratio would be positively 
influenced. In most programs, all employees pay the same rate. Therefore, by increasing the 
required contribution percentage, a plan would bring in more money and therefore see gains on 
their funded ratio. The final variable indicates whether or not program participants are covered 
by Social Security. It is expected that if plan participants are covered by Social Security, the plan 
could offer a reduction in future benefits to employees as Social Security payments would 
supplement their retirement payments. As such, future liabilities would begin to decrease. As a 
result, the funded ratio would improve with lower future liabilities.  
 The final variable is a variable to measure the impact of time or year. The data includes 
measurements for the years 2002 through 2009. Measurements from 2001 have been exlucded as 
the base year for analysis. Given the recent economic recession, the time variable is expected to 
have a negative impact on the funded ratio. That is to say for each year beyond the base year, the 
funded ratio is expected to decrease by a given percentage to account for the economic and 
financial instability in the country. By combining the list of dependent and independent variables 
with the variable for years, the regression model is as follows: 
 
(1) actfundratio = constant + β1*totbrd + β2* prctparticpbrd + β3* invcncl + β4* members +           
β5* sscov + β6* arc + β7* jurisdiction + β8* prct_eecrate + β9* year + ε 
 
Data 
All data utilized in this analysis has been collected from the database Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College (2013). This database has annual data from 2001-2009 
related to state and local pension/retirement programs for all 50 states and select localities. Minor 
manipulation of the variables has occurred as outlined in the previous sections. 
Table 3 below provides the summary statistics from the analysis: 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Funded Ratio 84.337 16.613 19.1 147.7 
Total Board Size 9.884 3.450 1 20 
Percentage of 
Board Covered 
by Plan 
56.546 23.070 0 100 
Total Members 181255 231099 3246 1631769 
Annual Required 
Contribution 
(ARC) 
452579 704093 0 7242802 
Employee 
Contribution 
Percentage 
5.668 2.872 0 17.25 
N = 958     
 
Funded ratio, percentage of board members that are plan participants, and employee 
contribution percentage are all measured in percentages. Total board size and total program 
members are both measured as their actual values or numbers. ARC is measured in thousands of 
dollars. The two figures that should be addressed are the minimum values of zero for ARC and 
employee contribution percentages. These are actual values and not omissions by their respective 
programs. For at least on measurement there were programs that did not require a set percentage 
of required employee contribution nor was an ARC established either actuarially or by statutory 
regulation.  
The dummy variables included measuring the presence of an investment council, whether 
or not program participants are covered by social security and whether a program is operated by 
a state or city have all been reported in percentages. See Tables 4 -6, respectively, below. 
Table 4. Percentage of programs with and without an investment council 
 
With Investment Council 65.19 
Without Investment Council 34.81 
Total 100.00 
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Table 5. Percentage of programs with and without members covered by Social Security 
 
With Members Covered 75.40 
Without Members Covered 24.60 
Total 100.00 
 
 
Table 6. Programs that are and are not state managed 
 
Are not state managed (locally managed) 15.08 
Are state managed 84.92 
Total 100.00 
 
 
Results & Analysis 
 The regression methods utilized for this paper included Mixed Effects and Ordinary Least 
Squares modeling. The computer program Stata was used to compute all results and conduct all 
tests during the data analysis phase. The analysis began with first testing to determine whether a 
fixed effects model or mixed effects model was most appropriate. Based on the Hausman test 
results, the mixed effects model was indicated to be most appropriate. The first regression that 
was computed using the previously defined model (1) was a Mixed Effects regression analysis. 
The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
 The main independent variables returned results as predicted previously in Table 1. 
However, the only significant estimate was the presence of an investment council. The generated 
coefficient indicates that when an investment council is present the funded ratio is increased by 
7.219 percent compared to the base year of 2001. This result supports the notion that investment 
councils play an important role in the performance of a public retirement system. Systems that do 
not currently have an investment council may want to consider implementing one in the future.  
Although not significant at any level, the remaining target variables did return results as 
expected or that have the expected impact on the funded ratio. As the number of total board 
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members increases, the impact on the funded ratio is negative signifying that as boards get 
larger, the overall funded ratio decreases. As the percentage of board members that are active 
participants in their retirement systems increases, the funded ratio is positively influenced. This 
relationship would support the theory that since active program participant board members have 
a stake in the program performance, they would make decisions to secure their future benefits. 
That is, since they have a vested interest in the fund performance, they would more closely 
monitor its performance, including the funded ratio. Again, since both variables are not 
significant, the magnitude of their impacts cannot be expanded upon at this time. 
All remaining independent variables, except members covered by Social Security, 
returned significant mixed effects results. Of particular importance are the impacts of the 
jurisdiction of a program and the percentage rate of employee contributions. Both of these results 
were not only significant but they were in the opposite direction as originally hypothesized. The 
impact of jurisdiction was indicated to be negative at -10.05. This result indicates that when a 
public retirement system is managed at the state level, the impact on the funded ratio is 
decreased by 10.05 percentage points. Although the jurisdiction of most pension plans cannot be 
changed, this result should highlight the negative impact that state governments have on the 
performance of pension programs. Rather than being able to allocate additional resources to 
program management, there is the potential that a states increased size and capability is a 
hindrance and not a benefit. Even though the variable measuring the impact of members covered 
by Social Security was not significant, it did return a result with a positive coefficient as 
predicted. While nothing can be concluded regarding the magnitude of influence, it should be 
noted that the presence of a program to supplement retirement payments had a positive impact on 
the funded ratio.  
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 The second regression tool that was utilized to examine model (1) was Ordinary Least 
Squares. The OLS regression results can be found in Appendix B. All three target independent 
variables returned significant estimates. The impact due the presence of an investment council on 
the funded ratio is an increase of 7.841 percentage points when an investment council is present. 
Like the Mixed Effects results, programs should consider implementing an investment council if 
they have not already done so given the potential positive performance results. In terms of the 
total board members and percentage of board members that are program participants, the results 
not only matched the predicted impacts but are now significant. For each additional board 
member added, the funded ratio decreases by 0.506 percentage points. When the percentage of 
covered board members increases by one percent the funded ratio increases by 0.0626 percentage 
points. While governments may not want to consider increasing the board size of a program, they 
should however, consider adding members that have a vested interest in the performance of the 
program.  
 As was the case with the Mixed Effects results, the only non-significant independent 
variable was the presence of members being covered by Social Security. It cannot be said with 
any degree of certainty what the magnitude of impact is estimated to be from members being 
covered by Social Security but it can be generalized that there is a negative impact to the funded 
ratio. This result was different than originally hypothesized and contradicts the Mixed Effects 
results. The OLS estimate signifies that supplemental programs actually hinder the performance 
of the retirement system rather than boost the performance results.  
 In both models the estimates for the time variables are significant. In general, any year 
beyond the base year of 2001 has a negative impact on the funded ratio. The estimates in the 
Appendices represent the percentage decrease in funded ratio for each respective year. For 
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example, the OLS estimate for year 2008 is negative 13.50. This signifies a decrease in the 
funded ratio by 13.50 percentage points compared to the base year of 2001 for any program 
measurement from 2008. While not explicitly outlined previously, this result was expected given 
the recent economic crisis and recession during the middle to late 2000’s. 
 
Conclusion 
 Fact: Public pension and retirement systems are significantly underfunded. There is some 
discrepancy as to what the true magnitude of the actual unfunded liability is but it can be agreed 
that it is growing year by year. Previous research has been successful in identifying the cases of 
being underfunded but more research is needed to help get these systems out of the hole they 
have dug for themselves.   
One approach towards improving the future of the public retirement system is to examine 
the past performance of programs and to implement the characteristics that have a positive 
impact on performance. Although financial and demographic characteristics are important to 
dissecting performance so too are program governance characteristics. By utilizing the most 
recent data from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, OLS and Mixed Effects 
models have been generated to try and identify governance characteristics that programs should 
consider implementing. The results of the current analysis signify that public retirement systems 
should investigate the addition of an investment council to make investment decisions. For those 
programs that already have an investment council present, their funded ratios are increased by 
over 7 percent compared to those that do not have their own investment council. While the 
results of adding additional board members and allowing board members to participate in the 
retirement program were mixed, these characteristics should not be overlooked. With further 
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model specification and the use of data beyond 2010 as the information is reported, public 
retirement systems should be able to identify the characteristics that most greatly influence 
performance. Public systems at all levels need to be carefully examined and consider all options 
if the underfunded problem is ever going to be addressed and curbed.   
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Appendix A. Mixed Effects regression results modeling effect on account funded ratio 
 
N = 958   
   
VARIABLES Estimates (std. error) 
   
Total Board 
Members 
-0.426 (0.417) 
Percentage of Board 
Covered by Program 
0.0432 (0.0594) 
Investment Council 7.219** (2.831) 
Total Program 
Members 
1.21e-05** (5.67e-06) 
Members Covered by 
Social Security 
2.211 (3.226) 
Arc -1.76e-06** (7.85e-07) 
State or Local 
Program 
-10.05*** (3.667) 
Percentage of 
Employee 
Contribution 
-0.814*** (0.306) 
 0 (0) 
2002 -5.488*** (0.890) 
2003 -9.253*** (0.888) 
2004 -11.39*** (0.886) 
2005 -13.12*** (0.893) 
2006 -13.31*** (0.900) 
2007 -12.06*** (0.905) 
2008 -14.72*** (0.916) 
2009 
 
-19.31*** (0.936) 
Constant 106.2*** (6.365) 
   
   
Number of id 112  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B. OLS Regression results modeling effect on account funded ratio 
 
N = 958   
   
VARIABLES Estimates (std. error) 
   
Total Board 
Members 
-0.506*** (0.171) 
Percentage of Board 
Covered by Program 
0.0626*** (0.0228) 
Investment Council 7.841*** (1.059) 
Total Program 
Members 
2.87e-05*** (3.86e-06) 
Members Covered by 
Social Security 
-0.411 (1.312) 
Arc -8.40e-06*** (1.29e-06) 
State or Local 
Program 
-11.41*** (1.208) 
Percentage of 
Employee 
Contribution 
-1.192*** (0.214) 
   
2002 -5.673** (2.253) 
2003 -9.212*** (2.194) 
2004 -11.14*** (2.091) 
2005 -12.35*** (2.124) 
2006 -12.51*** (2.098) 
2007 -10.80*** (2.096) 
2008 -13.50*** (2.098) 
2009 
 
-17.25*** (2.166) 
Constant 109.9*** (3.143) 
   
   
R-squared 0.301  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
